Syrian Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Critical Reflections on the EU-Lebanon ‘Deal’ and the Concept of ‘Safe Country of Origin’
Photo by Sandor Csudai, https://www.refugeesupporteu.com/refugee-week-2024-big-give/. Licence CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
By Vasco Proença
Edited by Veronica Corcodel and Havva Yeşil
Abstract
This blog post assesses some of the main developments related to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers before and after the fall of the Assad regime, focusing especially on the role of the EU-Lebanon deal and the related debates on Syria’s ‘safety’. These developments are analysed mainly through the lenses of international and EU law.
Keywords: Syria, EU-Lebanon agreement, Cyprus, Safe country of origin
Introduction
Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, millions of Syrians have sought refuge, creating complex humanitarian and legal challenges. Central to these debates is the EU-Lebanon deal and the question of whether Syria can be classified as a ‘safe country of origin.’ Without claiming to fully evaluate the consequences of this deal, this work addresses the negative implications for Syrian refugees and asylum seekers that arise from it.
The EU and Lebanon do not have a formal agreement on migration in place. Like many other migration “deals”, the EU-Lebanon relations on migration unfolded within an informal framework, most recently through the EU’s announcement in Spring 2024 of a 1-billion-euro aid package for dealing with issues of irregular migration. Migration, however, as a subject of cooperation, can be traced back to the 2002 EU-Lebanon Association Agreement, which recognized migration as an important matter to be discussed for both parties.[1]
Moreover, the recent developments in relation to the EU-Lebanon ‘deal’ cannot be understood without the context in which the concerns of migration arose. In the Spring of 2024, such concerns were mainly related to Syrians, Lebanon being known for hosting more than a million Syrians at that time, reaching around 1.5 million by the end of 2024.[2] According to the UNHCR, since December 2024 and until 15 June 2025, there have been 106.754 newly arrived Syrians in Lebanon.[3] Considering that 119.873 Syrians have been inactivated from UNHCR registration records during the same period due to verified or presumed return from Lebanon, the approximate number of currently hosted Syrians in Lebanon remains, to this day, close to 1.5 million.
In what follows, the blog post will discuss the implications of the EU-Lebanon deal, understood as mainly affecting Syrians, as well as the controversial attempts to reclassify Syria as a ‘safe country of origin’.
- The EU-Lebanon ‘Deal’ and Its Implications
The €1 billion EU–Lebanon aid package announced in 2024 builds upon the EU’s long-standing partnership with Lebanon, to be traced back at least to the 2002 EU-Lebanon Association Agreement, which was followed by European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans that reinforced commitments to deal with migration issues. However, the 2024 ‘deal’ is not a formal agreement, nor has it been formally included in an ENP Action Plan. Nevertheless, the €1 billion package draws mainly on the EU’s Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) within the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.[4]
In this sense, it is part of European Neighborhood Policy, which focuses on three main priorities for cooperation: “economic development for stabilisation,” “the security dimension”, and “migration and mobility.”[5] In line with these priorities, Von der Leyen’s announcement of the €1 billion package included not only migration, but also support to basic services such as health and social protection to the vulnerable population and economic reforms in line with the International Monetary Fund.[6] This mixture of economic development and migration policy entails a hidden causal relation of financial aid in return for migration policies that align with the EU policies.[7]
The EU-Lebanon deal has been particularly encouraged by Cyprus, known to be the Member State with the highest number of refugees and asylum seekers per capita.[8] The ‘deal’ celebrated between the EU and Turkey in 2016 concerning the arrivals of asylum seekers to the Greek Aegean islands, and the developments related to it, has diverted the trajectory of many Syrians towards Cyprus, mainly via Lebanon. [9] Responding to an increased flow of migrants trying to access the EU via the island’s UN demilitarized zone between Turkey and Cyprus, Cyprus reinforced border policing along the buffer zone. [10] In the first quarter of 2024, over 4,000 migrants reached the island, a significant increase from the 78 arrivals recorded in the first quarter of 2023.[11] Faced with a spike in Syrian asylum seekers coming from Lebanon, Cyprus’ response was to suspend the processing of all asylum applications from Syrian nationals by keeping them in a “limbo state”, abstaining from issuing decisions on the lodged applications in case a return of these persons were to become possible.[12] It is in this context that Cyprus proceeded to lobby EU institutions for a deal with Lebanon. Despite the acknowledgement of violations by Cypriot authorities, Cyprus’ efforts proved successful.
The EU-Lebanon deal is not unusual in EU migration policy. In the past decade, broadly speaking, multiple partnerships of border externalisation have been agreed between the EU and neighbouring countries – often informally – such as those with Tunisia and Libya.[13]
Since the announcement of the 2024 EU-Lebanon aid package, major changes have taken place in the region, such as the fleeing of some Syrian refugees due to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah[14], the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, or the recently announced EU funding to Lebanon’s military forces.[15] However, these developments have not altered the EU-Lebanon partnership: the focus has remained on the investment in Lebanese security, by “providing equipment, training and the necessary infrastructure for border management.”[16]
While asserting a commitment “to keeping legal migration routes open and resettling refugees from Lebanon to the EU”[17], it is well-known that resettlement is a weak mechanism that relies on Member State’s will, and it is common for human rights to be disregarded in externalisation processes. This pattern is not new. Such processes consistently weaken access to asylum, exposing individuals to risks of human rights violations.[18] Moreover, the deal’s focus on cooperation to “prevent illegal migration and combat migrant smuggling”[19] further translates into the criminalisation of people fleeing conflicts and violence.
Such deals pose challenges to States’ compliance with their international obligations, especially the principle of non-refoulement and the broader prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment.[20] Multiple reports have recently emphasised the dire conditions under which Syrians live in Lebanon.[21] Lebanon still hosts approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, and 89% of Syrian households live in extreme poverty.[22] The country has been under an economic and financial crisis since 2019, had to endure the pandemic and the Beirut blast of 2020[23], while still ‘hosting’ the most refugees per capita and per square kilometre in the world.[24]
This context has led to the use of Syrian refugees as political “scapegoats” for Lebanese problems.[25] As a consequence, harsher measures against Syrians have been implemented, with reports of arbitrary detention, torture, and forced returns of Syrians to Syria.[26] Rather than improving their living conditions, the EU-Lebanon deal only aggravated these abuses.
Lebanese authorities have introduced new measures which tighten conditions for obtaining residence permits, require those who violate entry and residence laws to regularise their status at border centres or face expulsion, as well as measures that restrict employment opportunities for Syrians, prohibiting refugees from working in sectors outside of agriculture, construction and sanitation.[27] Furthermore, the escalation of the conflict in Gaza, as well as Lebanon’s involvement through the Israeli incursion on Southern Lebanon and the bombing of Beirut, has further endangered the displaced Syrians.[28]
It is unacceptable that European institutions, which claim to defend a plethora of fundamental rights,[29] externalise EU’s borders while disregarding what happens to those whom they choose to “keep outside” through these processes of externalisation. The same critique applies to readmission procedures, which increasingly rely on informal arrangements that bypass legal protections. The “informalisation” of readmission agreements between EU Member States and neighbouring countries often amounts to infringement of individual rights guaranteed by EU and international law.[30]
However, the formal nature of an agreement, be it an aid package or a readmission arrangement, is not enough to ensure the protection of human rights. Such agreements would additionally require monitoring mechanisms to ensure that human rights are indeed respected. In the case of readmission, said mechanisms would have to examine whether readmitted persons have their rights respected in the country of origin or a safe third country. Leaving civil society organizations to monitor human rights abuses is both impractical and inadequate. And doing it with a full understanding of what it encompasses for individuals in the region makes the EU a contributor to human rights violations.
In Lebanon’s case, before the fall of Assad’s regime, multiple deportations have been reported, with the UN indicating that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is aware of “13,772 individuals deported from Lebanon or pushed back at the border with the Syrian Arab Republic in approximately 300 incidents in 2023”.[31]
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December 2024 prompted a regional shift, and by July 2025 around 200,000 Syrians had returned from Lebanon to Syria.[32] The unfortunate consequence was the suspension by multiple EU countries of the processing of asylum applications for Syrians, with some arguing for a generalised policy of readmissions. And while it is not illogical to assume that most of this number reflects voluntary returns, the complexity of the region impels a more careful analysis.
The situation in Syria is highly unpredictable and fluid, and as posited by UNHCR, these returns are not necessarily permanent but instead “pendular and temporary”.[33] Given Syria’s proximity and the scars left by years of conflict, many refugees may first make short “accessing visits” before deciding whether to resettle permanently. Besides, not everyone can immediately return.[34]Such a decision involves a big risk and some monetary capacity. Most returning people have someone to return to or a place still waiting for them.[35]
At the same time, UNHCR reported that 108,032 Syrians had newly arrived in Lebanon since Assad’s fall,[36] a sign that conditions inside Syria remain dire.[37] This is particularly evident for groups such as the Alawite minority, which in the absence of transitional justice is a predictable target of persecution.[38]As of now, there is no data on deportation, refoulement or push-backs of Syrian asylum seekers in Lebanon, but, as aforementioned, Lebanon has responded with such measures before and it is eager to see an unidirectional flux of “return migration” in the border.
Such is particularly illustrated by the swiftly arranged meeting between Lebanon’s Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Syria’s “transitional president” Ahmed al-Sharaa to discuss matters concerning the interaction between these countries, with al-Sharaa pointing to Syria’s interest in “resolving the question of Syrian refugees in Lebanon”.[39] In this context, it is significant to mention that al-Sharaa led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant group in the rebel alliance to overthrow the Assad regime, a group still listed as a terrorist organisation by the UN, USA and the EU. Many questions remain about Syria’s future, but Najib Mikati was expeditious in affirming that “the best resolution” would be for Syrians to return to their country.[40] Statements such as these should make us particularly attentive to potential violations of the principle of non-refoulement. In what follows, the blog post further elaborates on why returning Syrians has been and remains problematic, something that does not seem to concern the EU.
- Syria as a “Safe” country of origin?
The EU-Lebanon ‘deal’ was already aimed at “safe, voluntary, and dignified returns of Syrian refugees” before the fall of the Assad regime, in conjunction with the objective of preventing illegal immigration in a context of almost-inexistent legal pathways to reach either Lebanon or the EU.[41] Such aims rely on the assumption that Syrians are by default non-deserving of international protection, and that returning them to Syria might be ‘safe’.
This assumption should be read against the backdrop of debates of reclassifying parts of Syria as safe. Such arguments have been voiced especially by Cyprus, with several EU countries having swiftly expressed their support.[42] The political discourse pushing for such reclassification began long before the fall of the Assad regime, unveiling the cynical nature of this political act, now diluted by the regime change. [43] It is undoubtedly troubling that the political desire for returning Syrians has been somewhat independent of the regime’s nature in Syria.
It is worth noting that, as of 2025, in the aftermath of Assad’s regime collapse, the Cypriot government claimed that “hundreds” of Syrian asylum seekers had withdrawn their asylum requests or even waived their refugee or subsidiary protection status.[44] Such statements are, however, to be at best nuanced, considering that to this day, according to the UNHCR, the number of Syrians refugees remains close to 1.5 million and that, during the 8 January 2025 Security Council meeting, the UN Special Envoy for Syria described the transitional phase in Syria as a moment fraught with “real dangers”.[45]
In any case, the concept of a “safe country of origin”, embedded in EU legislation, merits a closer examination for a better understanding of the debates on safety related to Syria and its legal foundations. In EU law, this concept was defined by the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) (2013/32/EU) and has been retained under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.[46] Paraphrasing Annexe I of the APD, a country is considered “safe” if it consistently shows no signs of persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and no threat of indiscriminate violence in armed conflicts.[47] A designation of a country of origin as ‘safe’ triggers the application of an accelerated procedure, which in practice results in a high probability of rejection of the application for international protection. With the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in May 2024 and applicable from June 2026, the use of accelerated procedures in this context becomes mandatory.
As it is currently defined, the concept does not provide for the possibility of designating only parts of a country as safe. Moreover, the Court of Justice of the EU has recently decided that, considering the wording of the Asylum Procedures Directive, its objectives, as well as the stated intention to remove the possibility to list parts of countries as ‘safe’ in the proposal for the Directive, such designation was not in line with the 2013 APD.[48] In this sense, the practice of designating parts of Syria as ‘safe’ for the purposes of the asylum procedure, by Cyprus and other Member States, was not – and continues to not be – in line with the APD.
However, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum revisits the current approach and explicitly allows designating ‘specific parts’of a non-EU country’s territory as ‘safe’ and for ‘clearly identifiable categories of persons’.[49] In this sense, and given the importance that the CJEU has given in its decision to the wording, historical context, and objectives of EU secondary legislation, such partial designation will most likely be upheld if a new preliminary reference question is brought before the CJEU in relation to the 2024 Regulation. It is important, however, to recall that the CJEU stressed the importance of the ‘safe country of origin’ concept to be used in a manner that complies with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the Refugee Convention.
While the principle of non-refoulement[50] prevents the return of an individual to a country where they would face serious harm, the designation of countries as “safe” can hinder compliance with this principle, especially if not regularly and rigorously reviewed. As previously mentioned, even before the fall of Assad’s regime, some European governments pushed for an “interpretation” of Damascus and some areas controlled by the regime as “safe”, intending to enable legal returns and readmissions.[51] The regime’s fall led a large group of countries in the EU — Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland — to join the once small group arguing for the reclassification of parts of Syria as safe.[52] Moreover, these countries followed Cyprus’ actions and halted the processing of asylum applications for Syrians.[53]
On the other hand, some civil society actors have argued that the notion of “safe country of origin” as such contradicts the Refugee Convention, particularly the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality provided for in Article 3.[54] The UNHCR, however, did not outrightly condemn the concept but has instead taken an approach focused on advocating for safeguards.[55] While it has reminded States of their obligations under Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has not gone so far as to claim that safe country of origin practices are inherently discriminatory. Such challenges, however, undoubtedly exist in a practice that significantly undermines the individualized assessment of the application for international protection in light of a generalized presumption of safety in the country of origin.
In light of these concerns, the EU and its Member States should not approach possible returns to Syria lightly, be it before or after the fall of the Assad regime. For many States, it has been tempting to use the fall of the Assad regime as an additional argument in favor of returns to Syria, something that they already favored prior to the change of the political regime. Such generalized statements, coupled with the controversial EU-Lebanon deal and its implications, ignore complex questions like the situation of Kurds and other minorities in Syria’s transition as well as that of those who supported the previous regime. While the contexts are different, examples such as the fall of Gaddafi in Libya and the crisis that followed to this day demonstrate that the end of a dictatorship is not enough to ensure safety.[56]
Conclusion
Syrian refugees and asylum seekers remain exposed to violations of European and international law, exacerbated by informal externalisation mechanisms such as the EU-Lebanon aid package. The EU failed to criticise and correct Cyprus’ breaches of International Law, and its acquiescence to Cyprus’ lobbying and its reliance on financial incentives for migration control have further endangered individuals fleeing conflict, poverty, and persecution in Lebanon.
Now, facing a new context, it is important that it acts with extreme caution and abstains from prematurely reclassifying Syria as safe, as the fall of the Assad regime should not automatically render that true. Risks remain high for minorities, returnees, and displaced populations, and premature reclassification of Syria as a “safe country of origin” threatens compliance with non-refoulement and individualized assessments under EU law and the Refugee Convention.
Rather than focusing on externalisation and financial leverage, the EU must demonstrate political courage and act in accordance with its own founding values. It should open safe and effective pathways to asylum and protect those in need. Otherwise, its migration and asylum policies reveal a stark discrepancy with its self-image as a bastion of freedom and human rights. [57]
[1]Art 64, Council Decision (EU) 2015/268 of 17 December 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, on a Framework Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Lebanon on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Lebanon in Union programmes [2015] OJ L 47/1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/268/oj accessed 12 June 2024; Peter Seeberg, ‘EU policies concerning Lebanon and the bilateral cooperation on migration and security – new challenges calling for new institutional practices?’ (2018) 4 Palgrave Communications 1.
[2] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees’ Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon (February 2025) https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/UNHCR_Flash_Intention_Survey2025.pdf accessed 13 June 2025.
[3] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Lebanon – Syrian Returns & Movements Snapshot, Dashboard & Factsheet, 15 June 2025 (published 16 June 2025) https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/116992 accessed 2 August 2025.
[4] EU Watch, Inside EU’s Financial Assistance: How the European Union Allocates Funds to Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories (January 2025) https://www.euwatch.be/inside-eus-financial-assistance-how-the-european-union-allocates-funds-to-lebanon-syria-and-the-palestinian-territories/ accessed 14 July 2025.
[5] European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (4 April 2022) https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy_en accessed 16 May 2024.
[6] European Commission, President von der Leyen reaffirms EU’s strong support for Lebanon and its people and announces a €1 billion package of EU funding (Press release, IP/24/2384, 2 May 2024) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2384 accessed 16 May 2024.
[7] Paolo Biondi, ‘The Externalization of the EU’s Southern Border in Light of the EU/Libya Framework Agreement: A Lawful Alternative or a Neo-Refoulement Strategy?’ (2012) 6 ICL Journal 144; Victoria McKay, ‘A “New European Border” on the Doorstep of Africa: The Externalization of Migration Management and Its Effects on Migrants’ Human Rights’ https://doi.org/20.500.11825/1119 accessed 16 May 2024.
[8] M Kantaris and M Theodorou, Cyprus’ ongoing migration challenge, ESPN Flash Report 2022/01, European Social Policy Network (ESPN) (European Commission 2022); Julia Litzkow, ‘Cyprus’ Migration Dilemma: Hardline Measures, Regional Conflict and Rising Pressures’ (Mixed Migration Centre, 27 October 2024) https://mixedmigration.org/cyprus-migration-hardline-measures-regional-conflict-and-rising-pressures/ accessed 27 January 2025
[9] Cyprus Refugee Council, ‘Overview of the Main Changes since the Previous Report Update – Cyprus’ (Asylum Information Database, European Council of Refugees and Exiles 2024) https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/cyprus/overview-main-changes-previous-report-update/ accessed 27 January 2025.
[10] Trimikliniotis (n 3); European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Mediterranean: UN Offers Condolences for Victims of Migrant Shipwrecks in Ionian Sea – Cyprus Rejects “Buffer Zone Migrants” amid Rising Tensions between Republic and UN – Hellenic Coast Guard Accused of Throwing Migrants Overboard to Their Deaths – Italian Cabinet Upholds NGO Request to Stop Sending Patrol Boats to Tunisia – Frontex Internal Review System Actively Undermined’ (28 June 2024) https://ecre.org/mediterranean-un-offers-condolences-for-victims-of-migrant-shipwrecks-in-ionian-sea-%e2%80%95-cyprus-rejects-buffer-zone-migrants-amid-rising-tensions-between-republic-and-un/ accessed 27 January 2025
[11] DW News, ‘Cyprus suspends Syrian asylum applications’ InfoMigrants (16 April 2024) https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/56472/cyprus-suspends-syrian-asylum-applications accessed 16 May 2024.
[12] ibid; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Mediterranean: Cyprus suspends processing asylum requests of Syrians enduring unbearable conditions in Lebanon and Syria … ECtHR issues another ruling about human rights violations in Greek “hotspots”’ (19 April 2024) https://ecre.org/mediterranean-cyprus-suspends-processing-asylum-requests-of-syrians-enduring-unbearable-conditions-in-lebanon-and-syria-%e2%80%95-ngos-call-on-malta-to-halt-pushbacks-to-unsafe-libya-%e2%80%95-refuge/ accessed 15 May 2024; Vera Haller, ‘Syrians in Cyprus live in limbo as government pauses asylum process’ The World from PRX (15 July 2024) https://theworld.org/stories/2024/07/15/syrians-in-cyprus-live-in-limbo-as-government-pauses-asylum-process accessed 28 January 2025; Michele Kambas, ‘Cyprus suspends Syrian asylum applications as it struggles with arrivals spike’ Reuters (14 April 2024) https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cyprus-suspends-syrian-asylum-applications-it-struggles-with-arrivals-spike-2024-04-14/ accessed 15 May 2024.
[13] International Rescue Committee (n 5); Elif Demirbaş and Christina Miliou, ‘Looking at the EU-Turkey deal: The implications for migrants in Greece and Turkey’ in Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Ibrahim Awad (eds), Migrations in the Mediterranean: IMISCOE regional reader (Springer International Publishing 2024) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5_2 accessed 28 January 2025; Biondi (n 22); Amnesty International, ‘Libya/EU: Conditions remain “hellish” as EU marks 5 years of cooperation agreements’ (Amnesty International, 31 January 2022) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/ accessed 28 January 2025.
[14] Maissam Nimer and Nora Stel, ‘Displaced again: Forced mobility from Lebanon to Syria’ (The Loop – ECPR’s Political Science Blog, 11 December 2024) https://theloop.ecpr.eu/displaced-again-forced-mobility-from-lebanon-to-syria/ accessed 1 February 2025.
[15] Council of the EU, ‘European Peace Facility: Council adopts the third assistance measure in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (press release)’ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/21/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-the-third-assistance-measure-in-support-of-the-lebanese-armed-forces/ accessed 12 July 2025.
[16] Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, ‘Press statement by President von der Leyen with Cypriot President Christodoulides and Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati’ (2 May 2024) https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-president-von-der-leyen-cypriot-president-christodoulides-and-lebanese-prime-2024-05-02_en accessed 16 May 2024.
[17] ibid.
[18] Human Rights Watch and others, ‘Lebanon: Joint Statement – Respect International Law in EU-Lebanon Migration Deal’ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/02/lebanon-joint-statement-respect-international-law-eu-lebanon-migration-deal> accessed 17 May 2024; Amnesty International, ‘Lebanese Authorities Must Halt Unlawful Deportations of Syrian Refugees’ (Amnesty International, 24 April 2023) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/lebanon-authorities-must-halt-unlawful-deportations-of-syrian-refugees/> accessed 20 September 2025.
[19] Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (n 16).
[20] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 150, art 33; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5, art 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85, art 3; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391, art 19; Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing Directive 2011/95/EU [2024] OJ L 174/1, art 21.
[21] Amnesty International, Syria: Refugees Face Detention, Torture and Death on Return (Amnesty International 2021) MDE 24/4583/2021, 12–13 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/4583/2021/en/> accessed 15 May 2024.; Human Rights Watch and others (n 18).
[22] Amnesty International (n 21) 12.
[23] Tom Perry, Timour Azhari and Maya Gebeily, ‘Explainer: Beirut Port Blast: Three Years on, Victims Still Await Accountability’ Reuters (3 August 2023) https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/beirut-port-blast-three-years-victims-still-await-accountability-2023-08-03/ accessed 17 May 2024.
[24] UNHCR, ‘UNHCR – Lebanon at a Glance’ (UNHCR Lebanon, 2024) https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance accessed 16 May 2024.
[25] Natasha Hall and Will Todman, ‘Lebanon’s Dangerous Campaign against Refugees’ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanons-dangerous-campaign-against-refugees> accessed 20 September 2025.
[26] Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: Stepped-Up Repression of Syrians’ (25 April 2024) https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/lebanon-stepped-repression-syrians accessed 16 May 2024; Amnesty International (n 21).
[27] Amnesty International, Lebanon: Hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees at imminent risk of deportation (MDE 18/8051/2024, 2024) https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde18/8051/2024/en/ accessed 20 September 2025; International Labour Organization, Policy Paper on Enabling Formal Employment: Work Permit Solutions for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (February 2025) 5 https://doi.org/10.54394/KOAD9172 accessed 20 September 2025; L’Orient-Le Jour, ‘Nouvelles Mesures Restrictives de la Sûreté Générale à l’encontre des Syriens au Liban’ L’Orient-Le Jour (8 May 2024) https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413084/nouvelles-mesures-restrictives-de-la-surete-generale-a-lencontre-des-syriens-au-liban.html accessed 17 May 2024.
[28] Le Monde with AFP, ‘Intense Israeli Bombing Rocks Beirut as Lebanon PM Urges “pressure on Israel” for Ceasefire’ (6 October 2024) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/10/06/intense-israeli-bombing-rocks-beirut-as-lebanon-pm-urges-pressure-on-israel-for-ceasefire_6728382_4.html> accessed 21 October 2024; InfoMigrants, ‘Syria: Thousands Displaced Once More after Attacks and Killings in Latakia’ (InfoMigrants, 26 March 2025) <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/63635/syria-thousands-displaced-once-more-after-attacks-and-killings-in-latakia> accessed 20 September 2025.
[29] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5.
[30] Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’ (2007) The International Spectator https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03932720701406365 accessed 16 May 2024.
[31] Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: Stepped-Up Repression of Syrians’ (25 April 2024) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/lebanon-stepped-repression-syrians> accessed 16 May 2024; UNSC, ‘Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) during the Period from 21 October 2023 to 20 February 2024’ (8 March 2024) UN Doc S/2024/222, 12.
[32] ANSA, ‘UNHCR: 200,000 Syrians Return from Lebanon after Fall of Assad Regime’ (InfoMigrants, 4 September 2025) <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/66768/unhcr-200000-syrians-return-from-lebanon-after-fall-of-assad-regime> accessed 21 September 2025; InfoMigrants (n 20).
[33] UNHCR, ‘Lebanon: Factsheet – July 2025’ (2025) https://www.unhcr.org/media/lebanon-factsheet-july-2025 accessed 21 September 2025, 2.
[34] Matthew Doran (n 42).
[35] Ibid.
[36] ibid.
[37] UN News, ‘More than 125,000 refugees return to Syria in desperate conditions’ (9 January 2025) https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1158841 accessed 20 September 2025.
[38] Adam Fefer, ‘Regime Change and Minority Risks: Syrian Alawites After Assad’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 July 2025) <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/07/syria-alawites-minority-postwar-post-assad?lang=en> accessed 21 September 2025.
[39] Al Jazeera, ‘Lebanon’s PM Meets Syria’s de Facto Leader in Damascus’ Al Jazeera (11 January 2025) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/lebanons-pm-meets-syrias-de-facto-leader-in-damascus accessed 13 February 2025.
[40] Matthew Doran, ‘Uncertainty for Syrian Refugees Waiting for Safe Return after Assad’s Fall’ ABC News (16 December 2024) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-17/middle-east-doran-syrian-refugees-assad-collapse/104733516> accessed 13 February 2025.
[41] European Commission (n 6)
[42] Gina Agapiou, ‘EU States Back Cyprus on Syria’s Safe Areas Reclassification’ Cyprus Mail (19 April 2024) https://cyprus-mail.com/2024/04/19/eu-states-back-cyprus-on-syrias-safe-areas-reclassification accessed 14 February 2025; Michele Kambas (n 12).
[43] KISA, ‘The government is pushing refugees into a new cycle of exploitation and violence’ (29 April 2024) https://kisa.org.cy/οι-πρόσφυγες-σπρώχνονται-σε-νέο-κύκλο accessed 15 May 2024; FELLNER! LIVE: Gerhard Karner Im Interview (Directed by OE24.TV, 2024) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JkkCagmZP-o accessed 15 May 2024; Michele Kambas (n 12).
[44] InfoMigrants, ‘Cyprus: “Hundreds” of Syrian Asylum Seekers Withdraw Applications’ (InfoMigrants, 6 February 2025) https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/62685/cyprus-hundreds-of-syrian-asylum-seekers-withdraw-applications accessed 13 February 2025.
[45] UNHCR (n 3); UN News, ‘A Syrian-led future: Security Council highlights priorities ahead’ (8 January 2025) https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1158836 accessed 2 August 2025.
[46] Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] OJ L 180/60. See also Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU OJ L 2024/1348, Art. 61.
[47] This regulation is to be replaced by the Asylum Procedure Regulation (Regulation 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU), and the concept of “safe country of origin” is described in Article 61 of said regulation.
[48] CJEU, Case C-406/22, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, Judgment of 4 October 2024.
[49] Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, OJ L [2024] 1348 art 61(2).
[50] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 150, art 33; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5, art 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85, art 3; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European [2012] OJ C 326/391, art 19; Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing Directive 2011/95/EU [2024] OJ L174/1, art 21.
[51] KISA, ‘The government is pushing refugees into a new cycle of exploitation and violence’ (29 April 2024) <https://kisa.org.cy/%ce%bf%ce%b9-%cf%80%cf%81%cf%8c%cf%83%cf%86%cf%85%ce%b3%ce%b5%cf%82-%cf%83%cf%80%cf%81%cf%8e%cf%87%ce%bd%ce%bf%ce%bd%cf%84%ce%b1%ce%b9-%cf%83%ce%b5-%ce%bd%ce%ad%ce%bf-%ce%ba%cf%8d%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%bf/> accessed 15 May 2024; FELLNER! LIVE: Gerhard Karner Im Interview (Directed by OE24.TV, 2024) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JkkCagmZP-o> accessed 15 May 2024; Michele Kambas, ‘Cyprus Suspends Syrian Asylum Applications as It Struggles with Arrivals Spike’ Reuters (14 April 2024) <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cyprus-suspends-syrian-asylum-applications-it-struggles-with-arrivals-spike-2024-04-14/> accessed 15 May 2024; FELLNER! LIVE: Gerhard Karner Im Interview (n 44).
[52] Lorne Cook, ‘EU Countries Double down on a Halt to Syrian Asylum Claims but Will Not yet Send People Back’ AP News (12 December 2024) <https://apnews.com/article/syria-refugees-europe-asylum-freeze-76757aebb499c2f904b4340cb00b00c7> accessed 21 February 2025.
[53] Bethany Bell, Damien McGuinness, and Tom McArthur, ‘Syrian Asylum Seekers in Limbo as Countries Halt Applications’ BBC (9 December 2024) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cnv3qnzz7rjo> accessed 21 February 2025; Lorne Cook (n 54).
[54] International Commission of Jurists, ‘Compromising Rights and Procedures: ICJ Observations on the 2011 Recast Proposal of the Asylum Procedure Directive’ (2011) https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ICJ-asylum-procedure-directive-legal-submission-2011.pdf accessed 14 June 2025
[55] Cathryn Costello, ‘Safe country? Says who?’ (2016) 18(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 601-622.
[56] Human Rights Watch, ‘Libya: Events of 2024’, World Report 2025 (2024) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/libya> accessed 21 February 2025.
[57] Valentino Vondenhoff, ‘Studio Europa Maastricht – “Europe Is a Bastion of Freedom and Humane Laws.”’ (Studio Europa Maastricht, 4 May 2023) <https://studioeuropamaastricht.nl/2023/05/04/europe-is-a-bastion-of-freedom-and-humane-laws/> accessed 18 May 2024.
HOW TO CITE THIS BLOG POST:
Proença, Vasco. “Syrian Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Critical Reflections on the EU-Lebanon ‘Deal’ and the Concept of ‘Safe Country of Origin’”. NOVA Refugee and Migration Clinic Blog, October 2025, available at https://novarefugeelegalclinic.novalaw.unl.pt/?blog_post=syrian-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-critical-reflections-on-the-eu-lebanon-deal-and-the-concept-of-safe-country-of-origin
